In this paper we explore several fundamental relations between formal systems, algorithms, and dynamical systems, focussing on the roles of undecidability, universality, diagonalization, and self-reference in each of these computational frameworks. Some of these interconnections are well-known, while some are clarified in this study as a result of a fine-grained comparison between recursive formal systems, Turing machines, and Cellular Automata (CAs). In particular, we elaborate on the diagonalization argument applied to distributed computation carried out by CAs, illustrating the key elements of Gödel's proof for CAs. The comparative analysis emphasizes three factors which underlie the capacity to generate undecidable dynamics within the examined computational frameworks: (i) the program-data duality; (ii) the potential to access an infinite computational medium; and (iii) the ability to implement negation. The considered adaptations of Gödel's proof distinguish between computational universality and undecidability, and show how the diagonalization argument exploits, on several levels, the self-referential basis of undecidability.
Introduction
These selected quotations bring forward several of the key concepts which underlie the analogies -undecidability, universality and self-reference -and implicate them in the notions of chaos and complexity.
An undecidable problem is typically defined in computability theory as a decision problem for which it can be shown that a correct yes-or-no answer cannot always be produced by an algorithm. One of the most well-known examples of undecidable problems is the Halting problem: given a description of an arbitrary program (e.g., a Turing machine) and an input, it is impossible to construct an algorithm which would determine whether the program will eventually halt or continue to run forever. In the context of formal logic systems, an undecidable statement is a statement expressible in the system's language can neither be proved nor disproved within the very same system. The phenomenon of undecidability is present in dynamical systems as well, and needs to be distinguished from deterministic chaos:
"For a dynamical system to be chaotic means that it exponentially amplifies ignorance of its initial condition; for it to be undecidable means that essential aspects of its long-term behaviour -such as whether a trajectory ever enters a certain region -though determined, are unpredictable even from total knowledge of the initial condition." [6] , where the behavior is meant to be unpredictable without full simulation. While describing an example of undecidable dynamics of a physical particle-motion system with mirrors, Moore has also distinguished between "sensitive dependence" and "algorithmic complexity": in the former case the chaotic dynamics are unpredictable due to imperfect knowledge of initial conditions, while in the latter case (undecidability), "even if the initial conditions are known exactly, virtually any question about their long-term dynamics is undecidable" [48, 49] . A very well-studied type of discrete dynamical systems where the classes of ordered, chaotic and complex ("Edge of Chaos") dynamics have been identified and characterized is Cellular Automata (CAs), although the ability to quantitatively separate such classes is often questioned [20, 33, 63] . Computationally, CAs can be seen as information-processing systems carrying out a computation on data represented by an initial configuration [66] . Being a computational device, a CA may also be analyzed in terms of undecidable dynamics (although one must carefully specify what questions are put to a test), and such an analysis invariably involves the concept of computational universality [68, 69] .
As pointed out by Bennett [6] , "a discrete or continuous dynamical system is called computationally universal if it can be programmed through its initial conditions to perform any digital computation", and moreover, "universality and undecidability are closely related: roughly speaking, if a universal computer could see into the future well enough to solve its own halting problem, it could be programmed to contradict itself, halting only if it foresaw that it would fail to halt." This succinct phrase emphasizes that undecidability is a consequence of universality, and reaches to the core of the self-referential argument utilized in demonstrating undecidability within various computational frameworks.
This brings us to one of the central objectives of this work -elaborating on the role played by self-reference in distributed computation carried out by CAs. The Liar's Paradox which has captured the imagination of philosophers and logicians for thousands of years is a self-referential statement the truth or falsity of which cannot be assigned without a contradiction: for example, the paradox can be presented as a statement of a person declaring that "everything I say is a lie", or more formally as "this statement is unprovable". It has achieved prominence in modern philosophical logic largely due to the motivation it provided to various proofs of incompleteness, undecidability, and incomputability. A fundamental aspect of this paradox, and the works which incorporated its main idea, is self-reference: the way the statement refers to its own validity. As we shall see, there is a close but subtle difference between the concept of selfreference and the diagonalization argument (dating back to Cantor's diagonal argument), both of which play important roles in formal systems, algorithms, and dynamical systems.
Despite the early realization of fundamental interconnections between formal systems, algorithms (Turing machines), and dynamical systems, the precise set of detailed analogies remains elusive, leading sometimes to inaccurate parallels. For instance, Casti offers a "logical route" to chaos, claiming that "that there is a direct chain of connection linking the existence of strange attractors, Chaitin's results on algorithmic complexity, and Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem" [13] . As he points out, Cellular Automata theorists, while distinguishing between "strange attractors" and "quasiperiodic orbits", "lump both types into the same category of "strange attractor" when trying to make contact with the traditional dynamical systems literature" [13] . Obviously, the analysis presented by Casti has since been further illuminated by studies of class IV CAs ("quasiperiodic orbits"), 2 Formal Systems and The Liar Paradox
Technical preliminaries
We shall briefly define formal systems in order to formulate the Liar's Paradox and establish the connections to self-reference and diagonalization. In doing so, we shall begin with original definitions of mathematical and elementary formal systems by Smullyan [60] , which utilise the concept of well-formed formulas built from some symbols. Then we extend the definition of a formal system with a grammar component which specifies how well-formed formulas are constructed in general.
Following Smullyan [60] , we can define a mathematical system with at least three items
A F is an alphabet, i.e., an ordered finite set of symbols, so that A * F is the set of words (strings) that can be formed as finite linear sequences of symbols from A F (i.e., A * F is formed by the Kleene operator applied to A F ); 2. X F ⊆ A * F is a specific set of axioms; 3. R F is a finite set of relations in A * F called rules of inference.
Axioms serve as premises for further inferences, by the inference rules, which can be stated in a generic form: zero or more premises ⇒ conclusion For example, the modus ponens rule of propositional logic a, a → b ⇒ b, infers the conclusion b whenever a and a → b have been obtained (either as given axioms, or as previous inferences). Axioms and inference rules are used to derive (i.e., prove) theorems of the system.
Typically, an expression W is said to be derivable or formally provable in F if and only if there is a finite sequence of expressions W 1 , . . . , W n in which W ≡ W n and every W i is either an axiom or results from the application of an inference rule to earlier expressions in the sequence [11, 54] . We follow the standard notation F W expressing that W is derivable in the formal system F, in other words that there is a proof of W in F, i.e., W is a theorem of F. However, in order to call W a theorem, one still needs to either apply some external criterion distinguishing W from intermediate derivations in advance, as a target expression, or recognize its standing as having a special salience at the meta-level, capturing it as a theorem (current developments are not able to formally distinguish such salience).
In forming the set of words A * F we did not need to follow any additional syntactic constraints, but one may choose to focus only on well-formed formulas (abbreviated as wff's), constructed from the alphabet A F following some grammar. The formalization of a grammar G F = A F , N F , P F , S F consists of the following components [15] :
1. a finite set A F of terminal symbols; 2. a finite set N F of nonterminal symbols, that is disjoint with A * F , i.e., the strings formed from A F ; 3. a finite set P F of production rules of the form
* , so that each production rule maps from one string of symbols to another, with the "head" string containing an arbitrary number of symbols provided at least one of them is a nonterminal; 4. the start symbol S F ∈ N F .
The terminal symbols may appear in the output of the production rules but cannot be replaced using the production rules, while nonterminal symbols can be replaced. For example, the grammar G F with N F = {S F }, A F = {a, b}, and P F with two production rules S F → aS F b and S F → ba, generates wff's a n bab n , for n ≥ 0, e.g., ba, abab, aababb, and so on, by applying the first rule n times, followed by one application of the second rule.
Following more recent treatments of formal systems, one may explicitly include components of a grammar G in the definition
A F is an alphabet, i.e., an ordered finite set of symbols;
2. N F is a finite set of nonterminal symbols, including the start symbol S F ∈ N F , that is disjoint with A * F ;
3. P F is a finite set of production rules of the form
4. X F is a specific set of axioms, each of which must be a wff;
5. R F is a finite set of relations in the set of wff's, called rules of inference.
That is, while the production rules in P F are used to produce wff's, the rules of inference in R F are required to derive theorems. We would like to point out that if we consider all words (strings) in A * F as wff's, then the grammar would not be constraining the space of possible inferences. In a special case that a formal system contains negation, a system is called consistent if there is no wff W such that both W and ¬W can be proved.
It is usually required that there is a decision procedure (utilizing P F ) for deciding whether a formula is well-formed or not. In other words, it is generally assumed that the production rules are decidable: there is an algorithm such that, given an arbitrary string x, it can decide whether x is a wff or not. Inference rules need also be decidable in the following sense: for each inference rule R ∈ R F , there needs to be an algorithm such that, given a set of wff x 1 , . . . , x n and a wff y, the algorithm can decide if R can be applied with input x 1 , . . . , x n and produce output y. In general, we assume that we deal with recursive formal systems, that is, the set of axioms is decidable and the set of all provable sentences (i.e., the set of all theorems) is recursively enumerable or semi-decidable: if, given an arbitrary wff, there is an algorithm which correctly determines when the formula is provable within the system, but may either produce a negative answer or return no answer at all when the formula is not provable within the system.
Many important problems expressible in formal systems are undecidable, and this is captured in Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems about any formal system with first-order logic (first-order predicate calculus) and containing Peano's axioms of arithmetic: (i) any such formal system is such that, if it is consistent, then it is incomplete: there are wff's which can neither be proved nor disproved; (ii) moreover, such a formal system cannot demonstrate its own consistency.
Formal undecidability
We shall discuss several essential steps required in a typical proof of Gödel Incompleteness Theorems. Firstly, as we are dealing with arithmetic, we need to name, i.e., give a formal term ("numeral"), to each number: this is achieved by canonically denoting the natural number n by numeral n. Assuming that the primitive symbols, i.e. constant signs, such as '0' (zero) or 'S' (denoting "an immediate successor of ...") [50, 11] are available (directly or via interpretation), the canonical way to represent a natural number 'n' in a formal system is via the numeral n; n ≡ S . . . S n times
0.
One of the core insights of Gödel was to encode the wff's of a formal system by natural numbers, by an "arithmetization", or "Gödel numbering", of the wff's. Formally, for every wff W , the "Gödel numbering" scheme produces a natural number G(W ), i.e., the "Gödel number", which is further encoded by a numeral. Such a code, the name of the "Gödel number" of a formula W , is denoted as W .
To exemplify this, we firstly assign a natural number to each primitive symbol s of the formal system (called the symbol number of s), e.g., symbol "0" is assigned number 1 and symbol "=" is assigned number 5. Then we consider the wff W : "0 = 0". The Gödel number for this formula is uniquely produced as the corresponding product of powers of consecutive prime numbers (2, 3, 5, . . .), as G("0 = 0") = 2 1 ×3 5 ×5 1 = 2×243×5 = 2430. The name of the Gödel number "0 = 0" is the numeral 2430. Importantly, knowing G("0 = 0") = 2430 allows us to uniquely decode back into the wff's (due to the unique-prime-factorization theorem), by finding the unique sequence of prime factors, with associated exponents [53, 50] . Gödel numbers are computable, and it is important to note that it is also effectively decidable whether a given number is a Gödel number or not. Formally, W is the numeral G(W ), where G(W ) is the Gödel number of W [11, 21] :
One of the essential steps implicit in Gödel's proof is the Self-reference lemma [53, 61] :
Lemma 1 Let Q(x) be an arbitrary formula of formal system F with only one free variable. Then there is a sentence (formula without free variables) W such that
This lemma is sometimes called the Fixed-point lemma or the Diagonalization lemma. This result was explicitly presented in 1934 by Carnap [12] , phrased in different language, and was also used by Tarski in 1936 in proving the undefinability theorem: arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic [64] . The Self-reference Lemma establishes that for any formula Q(x) that describes a property of a numeral, there exists a sentence W that is logically equivalent to the sentence Q( W ). The arithmetical formula Q(x) describes a property of its argument, e.g., a numeral x, and hence, the expression Q( W ) describes a property of the numeral W . This is the numeral of the Gödel number of the formula W itself. Since the formula W is logically equivalent to the formula Q( W ), one can say that the formula W is referring to a property of itself (being an argument of the right-hand side). Strictly speaking, as pointed out by [53] , the lemma only provides a (provable) material equivalence between W and Q( W ), and one should not claim "any sort of sameness of meaning". It is, nevertheless, illustrative to consider a related result, a variant of the Mocking Bird Puzzle [61] , which reflects the idea of the Lemma's proof and constructs a self-referential relation.
"We are given a collection of birds. Given any birds B, C, if a spectator calls out the name of C to B, the bird B responds by calling back the name of some bird B(C) (Thus each bird B induces a function from birds to birds.) If B(C) = C, then we say that B is fixated on C. We call B egocentric if B is fixated on itself. We are given that the set of functions induced by the birds is closed under composition (more explicitly, for any birds B, C there is a bird D such that for every bird X, D(X) = B(C(X)) ). We are also given that there is a bird M (called a mocking bird) such that for every bird B, M (B) = B(B). The problem is to prove that every bird is fixated on at least one bird, and that at least one bird is egocentric."
The proof has several instructive steps [61] , reproduced here for convenience. Firstly, applying the closure under composition to a mocking bird M we note that there must be a bird D such that for every bird X, we have , completing the first part (proving that every bird is fixated on at least one bird). Hence, the mocking bird must also be fixated on some bird E, that is, M (E) = E. Again, by definition of a mocking bird, M (E) = E(E), yielding E(E) = E and completing the second part (proving that at least one bird is egocentric).
Obviously, the substitutions in this proof were made simple by ignoring the encoding and decoding of birds as arguments but it is still interesting to note that the mocking bird can be seen as an analogy of universal computation (a universal Turing machine or a universal cellular automaton, capable of emulating computation of any other device, see Section 4.4).
One now needs to define the provability predicate Provable F (x) which captures the property of x being provable in F. Let the formula Proof F (y, x) strongly represent the binary relation "y is (the Gödel number of) a proof of the formula (with the Gödel number) x" (following [53] , we note that it is always decidable whether a given sequence of formulas y constitutes a proof of a given sentence x, according to the rules of the formal system F). The property of being provable in F can then be defined as ∃yProof F (y, x), abbreviated as Provable F (x).
The final step leading to Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem is an application of the Self-reference lemma to the negated provability predicate ¬Provable F (x):
This then formally demonstrates that the system F can derive that W is true if and only if it is not provable in F. Furthermore, if the system F is consistent, then it can be shown that the sentence W is neither provable nor disprovable in F, showing the system to be incomplete. It is important to point out that the Gödel sentence W can be constructed as a well-formed formula of the system F. Common treatments of this seminal result interpret this theorem somewhat less formally, e.g., stating that the Gödel sentence W expresses or refers to its own unprovability [56] , analogous to the Liar paradox: (the sentence claiming "this sentence is false" that can be neither true nor false). This can be traced back to the original Gödel's work, where he informally wrote: "We therefore have before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable." [24, p. 149] .
What is important for our main purposes is that Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem can be used to demonstrate undecidability [53] . A formal system F is decidable if the set of its theorems is strongly representable in F itself: there is some formula P(x) of F such that F P( W ) whenever F W, and
For a weakly representable set of theorems only the first line of (2) is required (semi-decidability), that is, negations are not necessarily "attributable" to non-derivable formulas. However, it is possible to construct, within the system F, a Gödel sentence V P relative to P(x):
A contradiction follows, and hence, at least for this sentence the strong representability does not hold, and therefore, F must be undecidable. Crucially, the Gödel sentence V P is constructed as V ( V (x) ) for some wff V (x) with a free variable, and so our central expression (3) explicitly states
This perspective makes it explicit that the self-reference (or diagonalization) is used twice: inside and outside of the representative predicate P(x), which is "sandwiched" between the two self-references [22] . The interrelationships played by fixed points, diagonalization, and self-reference in proofs of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem are discussed in [11] , and we shall revisit these aspects in Section 5.
Turing Machines and The Halting Problem
Turing machines were introduced by Alan Turing as a formal model of computation, intended as an abstract general-purpose computing device which modifies symbols on an infinite tape (data) according to a finite set of rules (program). Prior to Turing's work the concept of an "effective process" had not been formalized, and so Turing's insight was to define the notion of an algorithm: an automated process that is able to proceed, using a set of predefined rules, through a finite number of well-defined successive states, eventually terminating at a final state and producing an output. The infinite tape of a Turing machine is divided into discrete cells, thus implementing an unlimited memory capacity. The data are encoded, using some alphabet, as the initial input string, while the remaining cells on the tape contain blank symbols.
A Turing machine employs a tape head which can move left and right across the tape, as well as read and write symbols contained in the cell to which the head points, thereby creating strings of symbols, from an alphabet Γ, on the tape (a string over an alphabet is defined as a finite sequence of symbols from that alphabet, while a language over an alphabet is defined as a set of strings [58] ).
These actions of the machine simulate an algorithm by following, at every given state, the rules described in its transition function, defined over a set of internal states Q and the alphabet Γ, as µ :
For example, if the machine is at a state q 1 and the tape head reads symbol a, then according to the machine's rules it may need to overwrite symbol a with symbol b on the tape, following which the machine switches its state to q 2 and moves to the right. Formally, this example can be expressed as µ(q 1 , a) = (q 2 , b, R).
The machine is able to distinguish certain predefined final states. For instance, if the machine enters the state q acc ∈ Q, this indicates that the initial input is accepted by the machine, while entering another state q rej ∈ Q represents that the input is rejected. Both of these outcomes cause the machine to halt, otherwise, the machine will continue its transitions forever [58, pp. 138 -140].
Technical preliminaries
A Turing machine, as adopted here following Sipser [58, p. 140 ] and Hopcroft and Ullman [26, p. 81] , is a tuple
where Q, Σ and Γ are non-empty finite sets, and 1. Q is a set of states;
2. q 0 ∈ Q is the start state; 3. q acc ∈ Q is the accept state; 4. q rej ∈ Q is the reject state; 5. Σ is the input alphabet not containing the blank symbol ; 6. Γ is the tape alphabet, where ∈ Γ and Σ ⊆ Γ \ { };
R} is a partial function called the transition function, where L is left shift, and R is right shift. If µ is not defined on the current state and the current tape symbol, then the machine halts.
The transition function µ may be undefined for some arguments. Specifically, the machine M halts in the accept q acc state (the initial tape contents is then said to be accepted by M ) or the reject q rej state (the initial input tape is said to be rejected by M ). With this definition, the output of the computation, if it halts, is the determination whether the initial input is accepted or rejected. However, one may equivalently define a Turing machine with just one halting state q halt ∈ Q, instead of two explicit accept and reject states. In this case, if the machine halts, i.e. if it enters the state q halt , then some content written on the same tape captures the actual output of the machine's computation. The precise position of such output on the tape depends in general on some convention and may be recognized in relation to the head position in a predesignated way, e.g., the head pointing to the cell containing the leftmost symbol of the output. This means that in the definition of a Turing machine with two final states q acc and q rej , the initial tape input represents both some initial data and some target to be verified (to be either accepted or rejected): the final content written on the tape when the machine halts at either q acc or q rej does not matter. On the contrary, in the alternative definition with just one halting state q halt , the target is not included on the tape's initial input: instead it is expected to be found as the output on the tape when the machine halts.
In the first case, when the target is given within the input tape, the machine needs to only accept or reject this initial input. In the second case the final output needs to be explicitly generated on the tape at the end of computation. Such flexibility in embedding the target reflects the duality of the data and the program in Turing machines, in the sense that a part of the input data may instead be represented in the internal machinery, and vice versa. Technically, one may construct a Turing machine working with an empty input tape, while solving a task completely embedded in the transition function over a certain set of internal states.
Given the current state q and the current content on the tape in the form uv, where two strings u and v are formed by symbols from Γ, with the head pointing to the first symbol of v, one may define a configuration of the Turing machine as u q v [58, p. 140]. For example, 11q 1 011 is the configuration when the tape is 11011, the current state is q 1 , and the head points to 0.
Incomputability
A Turing machine M recognises the language L M if and only if the set L M contains all the strings that machine M accepts.
In demonstrating the Halting Problem for Turing machines, we will show, following Sipser [58, p. 165] , the undecidability of the language where strings w are formed by symbols from the alphabet Σ, that is, all strings in the set Σ * formed by the Kleene operator, and [·] denotes an encoding of an object into a string using the alphabet Σ. Specifically, one may construct the encoding of a Turing machine M , denoted [M ], into a regular string that comprises the description of the tuple M . If needed, the string [M ] may be further encoded in a binary regular form. One may also encode compound objects, for example, create an encoding [M, w] of two elements M and w together, as long as there is a way to interpret such an encoding as having two components. In terms of computability, [·] and its partial inverse (i.e., decoding) must be effectively computable.
It will be crucial to deal with encodings [M, [M ] ] so that such an input to another Turing machine P can be decoded into two components: the description of the machine M and the input string A typical approach to the proof of undecidability of language A T M involves an assumption that A T M is decidable leading to a contradiction. That is, we assume that there exists a decider Turing machine P (note the analogy with the representative predicate P(x) used in the proof of undecidability of formal systems) such that on input [M, w], where M is a Turing machine and w is a string, the decider P halts and accepts w if M accepts w, while P halts and rejects w if M fails to accept w. Formally, the decider machine P is defined as
As an aside, the decider machine P is not a universal Turing machine (UTM) that can simulate an arbitrary Turing machine on arbitrary input. Unlike the decider P which rejects when M loops on w, a UTM simulating M would run forever on w if M runs forever on w. It is the assumed decidability of the universal decider P which will be refuted in the proof. Then we construct another machine V that is able to (i) interpret its input [M ] as the encoding of some Turing machine M , (ii) invoke, as a subroutine, the decider machine P with input [M, [M ] ], and (iii) once the decider P halts with either accept or reject (which is ensured by the assumption that P must halt on any input [M, w]), the machine V inverts the outcome of P . That is, the machine V accepts the input
. Formally, the inverter machine V , which includes three distinct steps, is defined as follows:
In creating the input [M, [M ] ] for the decider machine P we forced the machine M to run on the input representing its own description [M ] . This is a manifestation of self-reference (similar to the "inside" self-reference used in construction of the Gödel sentence). It is also important to realise that the input to the inverter machine V is given by the encoding [M ] and not by the compound object [M, [M ] ] which is constructed by V before calling the "sandwiched" decider subroutine P . This construction is possible because both the encoding and decoding are effectively computable (again we draw an analogy with the encoding and decoding utilized by Gödel numbering scheme W = G(W )).
The final step is to run the inverter machine V on itself, that is, to consider V ([V ]) (in analogy to the "outside" self-reference in Gödel's proof):
This is, of course, a contradiction analogous to the Liar's Paradox (or the inconsistency shown by the Gödel sentence in formal systems): the inverter machine V rejects its input [V ] whenever V accepts [V ]. This contradiction shows the impossibility of the decider Turing machine P , and hence, the undecidability of language A T M . One corollary is that the language A T M is TM recognisable but not decidable As the proof shows, the undecidability arises due to the self-referential ability of a Turing machine to interpret and run an input which encodes its own description, reflecting the program-data duality.
The program-data duality, allowing programs to interpret other programs (sets of rules) as data (encoded strings . , 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, . . .) . Most applied work with CAs considers finite automata, but infinity is necessary to generate undecidable dynamics, similarly to the infinite tape in Turing machines.
Each cell is updated in discrete time steps t according to a deterministic local rule φ C involving values of r neighbouring cells, and by convention a cell is included in its neighbourhood:
so that the value of the i-th cell at time t is updated as follows:
The set of all configurations will be denoted as
C . This local rule yields a global mapping (global rule) setting temporal dynamics on the lattice:
The configuration c at time t is completely determined by the preceding configuration:
while the initial configuration c 0 is a sequence of cells in the lattice at time t = 0. Formally, a CA C is a tuple:
and in order to specify its dynamics we shall use the notation C(c 0 ) for the initial configuration c 0 . For example, a one-dimensional (d = 1) CA C with a binary alphabet A C = {0, 1} may use a local update rule φ C defined for a neighbourhood with 3 cells (i.e., r = 1), setting dynamic updates as:
There are 8 = 2 3 permutations of inputs into the local rule φ C , and consequently, 256 = 2 8 local rules in total. This type of CA with two possible values for each cell and local update rules defined only on the current state of the cell and its two nearest neighbors is called Elementary Cellular Automata (ECAs). A scheme, known as the Wolfram code, assigns each ECA rule a number from 0 to 255 as follows: the resulting states for each possible input permutation (written in order 111, 110, . . . , 001, 000) is interpreted as the binary representation of an integer. For instance, the ordered resulting states 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0 of φ C constitute the rule 110, because the integer 110 has a binary representation of 01101110 [69] . The rule 110 is of particular interest because it is the only one-dimensional CA which has been proven to have the same computational power as a universal Turing machine [16] , and therefore, its dynamics are undecidable.
Another well-studied example is Conway's Game of Life [23] : a two-dimensional (d = 2) CA G with a binary alphabet A G = {0, 1} and a specific local update rule φ G defined for the Moore neighbourhood with 9 cells (i.e., r = 1): φ G : A It is well-known that Game of Life is also undecidable, having the same computational power as a universal Turing machine [7] .
Termination condition
As our general purpose is to study analogies and equivalencies between CAs and other systems which compute or prove specific outcomes, we need to adopt a convention determining when the desired output has occurred, i.e., trace the dynamics of the input configuration until some "halting" condition applies [62] . Importantly, as pointed out by Sutner [62] , this condition must be primitive recursively decidable, but a precise mechanism may vary: for example, a termination condition may check if a particular predesignated cell reaches a special state, or if an arbitrary cell or a set of cells reach a special predefined state(s), or if the configuration is a fixed point.
Importantly, we distinguish among fixed points c * by arbitrarily designating some of those as "accepted" and the rest as "rejected" outcomes (to stay closer to the intuition behind the proof of undecidability presented in the previous section). This can be done by arbitrarily partitioning the set of all configurations Ψ C into two sets, Ψ + C and Ψ − C = Ψ C \ Ψ + C , so that a fixed-point configuration c t ∈ Ψ + C can be interpreted as an accepted outcome, and a fixed-point configuration c t ∈ Ψ − C would correspond to a rejected outcome. This partitioning is formally described by function π C : Ψ C × Ψ C × N → {1, 0} such that, at time t ∈ N, π C (c t ) = 1 if and only if c t is a fixed point, i.e., c t = c t−1 , and c t ∈ Ψ + C , while π C (c t ) = 0 if and only if c t = c t−1 and c t ∈ Ψ − C . In order to make concrete this arbitrary partition of the configuration space, we may choose any single cell, e.g., c t 42 , then select a specific symbol α ∈ A C , and then, for a fixed-point c t , assign π C (c t ) = 1 if and only if c t 42 = α, and π C (c t ) = 0 if and only if c t 42 = α. Therefore, in general, one may extend the definition of a CA C to include a termination condition π C :
so that C(c 0 ) specifies the CA dynamics starting from initial configuration c 0 . The inequality c t = c t−1 is always computable. However, due to the finitary nature of all computations, the equality is not decidable in type-2 computability [62] (the framework of Type-2 Theory of Effectivity allows for computability over sets of a cardinality up to continuum [65] ), and so there is no guarantee that the termination condition can be effectively checked for any given pair c t and c t−1 , because the lattice is itself infinite. As we shall see in the next subsection, one may restrict the space of possible CA configurations to certain subspaces within which the termination condition can always be checked in a primitive recursively decidable manner. Henceforth we follow the approach which restricts the space of possible CA configurations to only those subspaces over which a recursively decidable test of termination conditions is possible. As pointed out by Sutner [62] , all of these subspaces are closed under the application of a global map Φ C , ensuring that the dynamics stay within the restricted space.
We will abbreviate the case when a CA C terminates at a configuration c t ∈ Ψ + C as follows C : c 0 → c + , and the case terminating at c
It is worth pointing out that membership c
is computable within the restricted subspace of possible CA configurations, i.e., a recursively decidable test of membership is ensured. Our choice of the distinction between the fixed points in Ψ + C and Ψ − C as opposite outcomes of the computation carried by the dynamics is somewhat arbitrary. Importantly, any such distinction needs to be encodable into a regular string, for example, the determination of a fixed-point satisfies the requirement of being effectively computable during CA run-time (i.e., it is intrinsic to CA dynamics), and all that needs to be encoded is the assignment of "accept" or "reject" labels to the chosen binary outcomes.
With such a termination condition it is possible to frame a question on decidability of CA dynamics directly, without tasking an algorithm external to the CA to check whether the CA dynamics do or do not ever reach the given target configuration.
Others have shown that there is a way to simulate a Turing machine M with a one-dimensional CA C, by creating the alphabet A C as the union of the set of states Q and the tape alphabet Γ of M , and constructing the local update rule φ C out of the transition function µ by smartly interleaving state symbols q ∈ Q and tape symbols γ ∈ Γ [20, p. 121]. For example, the transition resulting in the move of the machine's head to the right corresponds to these two local CA updates by φ C : if µ(q 1 , γ 1 ) = (q 2 , γ 2 , R), then φ C ( * , * , q 1 , γ 1 , * ) = γ 2 and φ C ( * , q 1 , γ 1 , * , * ) = q 2 , where * matches any state. One may see a parallel here with one-dimensional configurations of Turing machines 3.1. As a result, the computation carried out by a Turing Machine, updating over the set of states Q and the tape alphabet Γ, i.e. over Q × Γ, can be made equivalent to dynamics of the corresponding automaton which modifies its configurations c t ∈ A Z C . Consequently, there is a correspondence between the combination of the Turing Machine's start state q 0 ∈ Q and its initial tape pattern formed by symbols from Σ, on the one hand, and the initial configuration c 0 ∈ A Z C of the CA, on the other hand. Finally, the role of the machine's accept and reject states q acc ∈ Q and q rej ∈ Q may be played by the termination condition π C checking whether configurations are fixed-points in Ψ
Classifications of Cellular Automata
The repeated application of a global rule Φ C , starting from the initial configuration c 0 , produces an evolution of configurations c t over time. Of interest in the analysis of CAs is the long-term asymptotic behavior. In classifying global CA rules according to these asymptotic dynamics, the following qualitative taxonomy is typically employed [67] :
• class I (evolution leads to a homogeneous state);
• class II (evolution leads to periodic configurations);
• class III (evolution leads to chaotic patterns);
• class IV (evolution leads to complex localized structures over long transients).
In other words, class I consists of CAs that, after a finite number of time steps, produce a unique, homogeneous state (analogous to "fixed point"dynamics). Class II contains automata which generate a set of either stable or periodic structures (typically having small periods -analogous to "limit cycle" dynamics) -each region of the final configuration depends only on a finite region of the initial configuration. Class III includes CAs producing aperiodic ("chaotic") spatiotemporal patterns from almost all possible initial states -the effects of changes in the initial configuration almost always propagate forever, and a particular region of the final configuration depends on a region of the initial configuration of an ever-increasing size (analogous to "chaotic attractors"). Class IV includes CAs that generate patterns continuously changing over an unbounded transient, and some of these CAs have been shown to be capable of universal computation [67, 16, 69] .
Culik and Yu formalized this hierarchy further [29, 63, 62 ]:
• CY 1 : All configurations evolve to a fixed point.
• CY 2 : All configurations evolve to a periodic configuration.
• CY 3 : The orbits of all configurations are decidable.
• CY 4 : No constraints.
Yet another classification attempt was proposed to classify CAs as dynamical systems (X; F ), consisting of a compact metric space X and a continuous function F from space X to itself, according to their degree of equicontinuity [35, 20] . Given a metric ρ(x, y), a point x ∈ X is an equicontinuity point for function F , if for any > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for any y ∈ X, ρ(x; y) ≤ δ implies that ∀t ∈ N, ρ(F t (x); F t (y)) < . If all points of a perfect space X are equicontinuity points then F is equicontinuous. For example, periodic systems are trivially equicontinous, as small errors in initial conditions will not grow during evolutions [35, 20] . The classification is then based on comparing the set E of equicontinuity points of a given CA to the set X of all its configurations:
• K 1 : E = X (i.e., all configurations are equicontinuity points).
• K 2 : E = ∅ (i.e., there are some equicontinuity points among configurations).
• K 3 : E = ∅ (i.e., there are no equicontinuity points among configurations).
• K 4 : expansive CAs.
Crucially, Wolfram's approach, as well as other classifications [29, 37, 35, 63, 62] , propose to categorise the asymptotic dynamics of CAs for all initial configurations -a task which in itself is typically not decidable even for most basic decision problems [33, 63, 62] . For example, we may consider nilpotent CAs which have the most trivial dynamics possible: all possible initial configurations c 0 ∈ Ψ C lead to the same fixed point configuration after a finite number of time steps. It has been pointed out that the question whether a given CA is nilpotent turns out to be undecidable in any dimension [33] . Most of the classes in the equicontinuity classification scheme [35] , specifically, K 1 -K 3 , have also been shown to be undecidable [20] .
It is important to distinguish between (i) (possibly undecidable) questions about CA dynamics on all possible initial configurations, and therefore, about the CAs classification, and (ii) (possibly undecidable) questions whether the CA dynamics can ever reach a target configuration for a given initial configuration. An extensive analysis of the classification problem and its undecidability for a broad range of cases has been provided by Sutner [63, 62] and others [20, 33] . The important insight in dealing with the classification problem is a restriction of the space of possible configurations to certain subspaces, which include, for example, configurations with finite support, or spatially periodic configurations, or almost periodic configuration, or in the most general case, recursive configurations, where a cell state is assigned by a computable function, so that such a restriction produces an "effective dynamical system" [62] .
Universal Cellular Automata
A universal CA is a CA which, like a Turing machine, can emulate any CA. A two-dimensional CA capable of universal computation and self-reproduction (universal construtor) was created by von Neumann, using 29 states per cell. The number of required states was reduced to 20 by Arbib [3] . Smith later [59] described a universal CA using 18 states and nearest-neighbor 1-dimensional rules, that can simulate a Turing machine in such a way that the end of computation was indicated by reaching a fixed-point. Albert and Culik [1] constructed a CA as a 14-state nearest-neighbor CA capable of emulating all other CAs. Bringing the number of states down further, Lindgren and Nordahl [38] described a 7-state nearest-neighbor universal cellular automaton. Again, the end of computation was indicated by reaching a fixed-point or by reaching a temporal cycle of lenght two: importantly, this can be determined by comparing configurations at different time steps. One of the simplest universal CAs has been shown to be the rule 110 ECA with just 2 states which happen to be sufficient for producing universality in a 1-dimensional CA [16] .
A universal CA has the same power as a universal Turing machine, and is, therefore, undecidable. For example, whether an initial state will ever reach a quiescent state can be seen as the CAs equivalent of the undecidable Halting Problem [10, 32] . The undecidability of CA dynamics and the role played by self-reference will be discussed in the next section, and here we point out several aspects that are important in constructing universal CAs.
First of all, in constructing universal CAs one must derive a way to encode any simulated CA and its initial configuration (or, typically, a Turing machine), as data in the form that can be used by the universal CA. Without loss of generality, we can assume that such an encoding [C, c 0 ] can be produced in a primitive recursively decidable way, as one only needs to encode the initial configuration c 0 from the suitably restricted subspace (e.g., recursive configurations) and the local rule φ C defined for finite neighbourhoods. As mentioned earlier, the ability to determine whether a configuration is a fixed-point or not is intrinsic to CA and, hence, does not need to be encoded. Therefore, encoding of a CA which has been extended with a termination condition π C needs only to include in addition the distinction between fixed-points in Ψ + C and Ψ − C . Such a distinction can be determined by the state of a single designated cell.
Secondly, there are circumstances when the computational process being simulated contains several distinct sub-processes, which may interact with each other. For example, the computational process carried out by the inverter Turing machine D, described by (6) , is comprised of three distinct sequential steps. A single CA C emulating such a machine could be constructed as a composition of a number of sub-process CAs C i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denoted C = ⊕C i , which can interpret and perform operations on the results of the intermediate dynamics [5] . The compositional techniques may vary, but typically involve an extended alphabet with additional symbols which are used in selecting, at different stages, the update rules φ Ci of specific sub-process CAs C i [4, Def. 4.1], or combining the update rules into a compositional update φ C [31, Def. 17] .
A third technique employed in simulating CAs uses the coarse-graining of the CA dynamics, by grouping neighboring cells into a supercell according to some specified convention (this essentially follows a renormalization scheme) [32] . A supercell is created by projecting the states of a block of cells of one CA C into a single cell of the coarse-grained CA C . The update rule φ C is constructed from the update of φ C by projecting its arguments and outcome, subject to certain commutativity conditions [32] , to the arguments and outcomes defined for supercells. Such a coarse-grained emulation of C may or may not be carried out without loss of relevant dynamic information, but a universal coarse-grained CA C ensures that all dynamics can be preserved.
Undecidable dynamics
In this section we sketch a proof of the undecidability of CA dynamics, following the steps used in the proof of the undecidability of language A T M , which demonstrated the Halting Problem for Turing machines, as well as the undecidability of formal systems. The traditional approaches typically establish an equivalence between CAs and Turing machines per se, and thus impute universality and undecidability of CAs based on these properties in Turing machines. Our purpose is more specific insofar as we aim to explicitly reconstruct the Halting Problem within the undecidable dynamics of CAs, exposing the Liar's Paradox analogy within this framework.
If CA dynamics were decidable, then there would have existed a decider CA with a binary alphabet P = (A P = {0, 1}), d, φ P , π P capable of simulating any other CA M = A M , d, φ M , π M starting from the initial configuration m 0 (again we note the analogy with the representative predicate P(x) used in the proof of undecidability of formal systems, and the decider Turing machine P ). As we have seen, a universal CA with a binary alphabet can be constructed, and it is the decidability of the dynamics created by a universal CA which we shall refute in the proof. The input of decider P is given as p 0 = [M, m 0 ], while the termination condition π P are specified in such a way that only two decidable outcomes are possible, being constrained as follows:
In other words, the dynamics of P terminate at some fixed-point configuration p t whenever the dynamics of M terminate at some fixed-point configuration m t . More importantly, whenever the dynamics of M reach a fixed point in the complement set Ψ − M or simply run forever, the dynamics of P are assumed to necessarily reach a fixed-point in the complement set Ψ − P . The ability to specify such a definitive termination condition for P is, in fact, the main assumption behind the decidability of CA dynamics, to be refuted by the proof that follows.
Having assumed that P exists, we construct another inverter CA V = A V , d, φ V , π V , running from the initial configuration v 0 = [M ] (intending to match the idea of a Gödel sentence in formal systems, as well as the inverter Turing machine V , with proper encoding and decoding). That is, the initial configuration [M ] does not immediately encode the compound object [M, [M ] ] which could have been used as an initial configuration by the decider CA P . However, it is possible to specify the updates of the local rule φ V in such a way that the dynamics of V emulate the dynamics of "sandwiched" P running on the configuration [M, [M ] ]. This corresponds to the step (6) in the undecidability proof for Turing machines where the decoding from [M ] was used to create an encoding of [M, [M ] ]. Similar to the inverter Turing machine V described by (6), the CA V will be a compositional CA V = ⊕V i , accounting for (i) decoding of [M ] by some CA V 1 , (ii) simulation of M running on [M ] by CA V 2 = P , as well as (iii) inverting the fixed-point outcomes produced by V 2 , by some CA V 3 , so that the termination condition π V matches the following:
The composition V = ⊕V i may be achieved in different ways, for example, by constructing and inverting the configuration [M, [M ] ] within the decoding dynamics of V 1 , while also inverting the actual dynamics of V 2 = P (i.e., inverting the arguments and outcomes of the update rule φ P ). In this case, the resultant fixed-point outcomes of V are already ensured to be inverted. We again point out the analogy with the "inside" self-reference in formal systems visible here in the CA M running on an encoding of itself. Finally, we consider dynamics of the inverter V running with the initial configuration v 0 = [V ] (this is, of course, similar to the construction of the "external" self-reference in formal systems), which corresponds to the following constraint, resulting from substituting the elements of V for the elements of M in expression (16):
The result is again a contradiction in the style of the Liar's Paradox: the CA V reaches a fixed-point in the subset Ψ − V whenever it reaches a fixed-point in the complement subset Ψ + V . This contradiction shows the impossibility of the existence of a decider CA P , and therefore, the undecidability of CA dynamics. We note that the inverter CA V was running on the input representing its own description [V ], while simulating the decider CA P "sandwiched" between the self-referencing V and the self-referencing M .
We re-iterate that universal CAs are definitely constructable and, for example, CA rule 110 has been shown to be capable of universal computation [16] . What is actually impossible is a specification of a definitive termination condition shown in (15) assigning binary outcomes for any possible CA M that is being simulated.
Diagonalization and self-reference
To illustrate the diagonalization argument employed in the undecidability proof(s) in various frameworks, we follow the expositions offered by Buldt [11] and Gaifman [22] in the context of formal systems, adapted for our purposes.
In Step 1, the (at most countable) set of all first-order expressions with the free variable x is considered:
In
Step 2, the set of all of their Gödel numbers is formed:
Step 3, all members of set B are used in place of the free variables of all members of the set A. Denoting W ij = W i ( W j (x) ), a matrix is constructed as shown in Table 1 .
The diagonal sequence {W jj } corresponds to the "first diagonalization" (i.e., first, or "internal", self-reference [11, 22] ).
The next step is to consider the row of the table, with an index k, corresponding to the predicate
. . . . . . Table 1 : First diagonalization (i.e., "internal" self-reference) for a formal system.
where the term diag(x) corresponds to a function diag(x) that maps the Gödel number of a wff W (x) to the Gödel number of the self-referential wff W ( W (x) ), that is:
As pointed out by Gaifman, it does not matter how the function diag(x) is defined on numbers that are not Gödel numbers [22] . The elements of the k'th row are formed, as any other elements of the table, by using all members of set B, i.e., the numerals W j (x) , in place of the free variable of the predicate W k (x):
In the style of Cantor's diagonalization method, we can informally say that the k'th row of the table "inverts" the diagonal entities W jj = W j ( W j (x) ), by applying ¬Provable F to numerals of their Gödel numbers. Importantly, the predicate
is itself a member of the set A, by construction being distinct from other members W j (x), see Table 2 . Table 2 : Second diagonalization (i.e., "external" self-reference) for a formal system.
The crux of the argument is the element W kk = ¬Provable F ( W k ( W k (x) ) ) which was also technically formed, at Step 3 above, as W kk = W k ( W k (x) ). Finally we arrive at a Gödel sentence γ = W k ( W k (x) ) which is neither provable nor disprovable in F, cf. key expressions (1) and (4) re-expressed in terms of γ:
Again, in forming the diagonal element W kk , the Gödel sentence γ is self-referencing: this is the second diagonalization [11] or second, "external" use of self-reference [22] . The diagonalization argument presented above can be seen almost as a template, including the first diagonalization W ij = W i ( W j (x) ), then the "inversion" ¬Provable F applied to numerals of Gödel numbers of the diagonal elements, and finally the second diagonalization where we construct the Gödel sentence γ = W k ( W k (x) ) used in expression (18) .
Using this template we can now apply the diagonalization argument to show the undecidability of both Turing machines, (5)- (7), and Cellular Automata, (15)- (17) .
In the Table 3 (15) . 
The assumption that there exists a decider Turing machine P (or decider CA P ) corresponds to "filling" the table with 'reject' entries in place of the blanks, as every program-data combination is assumed to be decidable, shown in Table 4 (5) and (15) . Table 4 : The cell i, j is the outcome of running P on
The diagonal sequence is a result of the first diagonalization (first self-reference), and we can now invert the diagonal elements in order to populate the row representing the inverter Turing machine (CA) V , analogously to the construction of Table 2 for formal systems, and matching the expressions (6) and (16) . The result of including the inverter machine (CA) V = M k , for some k, is shown in Table 5 , where the element (k, k) is an analogue of the Gödel sentence
, which is the second diagonalization. Neither 'accept' nor 'reject' in place of the element (k, k) would avoid a logical contradiction. This refutes the assumption of the existence of the decider machine (CA) P . 
One instructive comparison is that the decoding and encoding sub-steps used in creating
are analogous to the function diag(x) that maps the Gödel number of a formula W k (x) to the Gödel number of the self-referential formula
, and then run the decoded machine (CA) or use the formula W k (x) on itself, constructing the final
Comparative analysis
We have considered three computational frameworks (formal systems, Turing machines and Cellular Automata), focussing on self-reference, diagonalization and undecidability manifested on a fundamental level. In this section we offer a detailed comparative analysis across specific structural elements utilized in these frameworks. In doing so, we separately analyze different ways to structure the state-space, define the problem, and evolve the system's dynamics, culminating with a comparison of the mechanics of undecidability. While some of these comparisons are well-noted in the literature at a high level [13, 2, 30] , the rest, we believe, reveals the deeper formal analogies unifying the frameworks at a much more detailed level.
State-space
The three computational frameworks that we considered define their state-space in different but analogous terms, and Table 6 : State-space comparison across three computational frameworks.
The three row elements describing grammar/syntax/restriction must ensure that the well-formed formulas, tape patterns and CA configurations are effectively computable. In formal systems this guarantees that a decision procedure for deciding whether a formula is well-formed or not does exist; the tape patterns of a Turing machine are recognizable; and in CAs an "effective dynamical system" is maintained.
Problem definition and dynamics
The adopted definition of a Turing machine used two final states q acc and q rej to distinguish whether the initial input (which includes a target problem to be solved) is accepted or rejected. To re-iterate, according to this definition, denoted ( ‡), the initial tape input includes the target to be verified (to be either accepted or rejected), and therefore, the final content of the tape, upon halting at either q acc or q rej , does not matter. As mentioned, an equivalent definition of a Turing machine, denoted ( †), may have just one halting state q halt , in which case the target is not included on the tape's initial input, but when the machine halts, the content written on the tape represents the actual output of the computation.
The elements describing axioms and initial inputs/configurations, shown in Table 7 , leave some room in the initial conditions to also include the target statement: a theorem (in a formal system), a target to be verified (by a Turing machine), or a target configuration (of a CA extended with a termination condition).
Having considered the elements that define the problem and drive the system's "evolution", that is, the inference process within a formal system, the computation by a Turing machine, or the CA dynamics, we now turn our attention to the mechanics employed by the different proofs of undecidability in our three computational frameworks. Table 7 : Problem definition and inferences/computation/dynamics in three computational frameworks. Table 8 traces the key steps of the diagonalization argument. The existence of some elements in the table have only been assumed for the purposes of proof by contradiction, and we denote these lines by . Importantly, each of the proofs ends up in a contradiction. In formal systems, the proof constructs a Gödel sentence which yields a contradiction, expressed as an inability to resolve the question: F ? V P ↔ ¬P( V P ). This results in the Gödel Incompleteness Theorem that leads to undecidability. In Turing machines, the contradiction comes from trying to answer the halting question about the inverter machine running on the encoding of itself: V ([V ]) = ? which is the core issue of The Halting Problem. And in Cellular Automata, the conundrum manifests itself as the question of whether the inverter CA would reach a termination condition if presented with an initial condition that encodes its own description, V : [V ] → v ? . This, in our opinion, captures undecidable dynamics at the "edge of chaos".
Undecidable dynamics

Discussion
It is important to point out that in all considered computational frameworks the undecidable "dynamics" are possible even with perfect knowledge of the initial / boundary conditions of the system [6, 48, 49] . As mentioned in Introduction, this distinguishes undecidable dynamics from chaotic dynamics. Interestingly, undecidable dynamics can also be distinguished from unprestatable functions and their evolution [34] : when a dynamical system (e.g., a chemical reaction system) alters its own boundary condition, we cannot deduce the actual behavior of the system even from the same initial and boundary conditions. Unprestatable dynamics resulting from such, possibly iterative, modifications of the boundary conditions is also unlike standard chaos. However, the class of systems with dynamically altering boundaries and hence, unprestatable dynamics, is distinct from the systems with undecidable dynamics which evolve from fixed initial conditions. Therefore, one may be justified in defining a complex system as a dynamical system with at least undecidable dynamics, and possibly unprestatable dynamics.
As has been previously pointed out [14, 44, 52, 45] , undecidability may be fundamentally related to computational novelty, and so a mechanism producing novelty may need to be capable of universal computation. For example, Markose [45] recently argued that the issue of novelty production and "thinking outside the box" by digital agents must be immediately related to their capacity to encode a Gödel sentence in order to exit from known listable sets (e.g., actions, technologies, phenotypes) and produce new structured objects. This formalism follows Gödel Incompleteness Theorem, leading to undecidability
The Halting Problem Undecidable dynamics and the "Edge of Chaos" Table 8 : Proving undecidability in three computational frameworks.
Binmore [8] in highlighting the fundamental aspects of novelty generation through the lens of game-theory, and considering a strategic game with adversarial (contrarian) agents which act as the Liar by negating what it can predict or compute [45] . It has also been recently argued that evolutionary strategies in iterated games, in which the same economic interaction is repeatedly played between the same agents, can be seen as processes capable of universal computation [25] . In other words, undecidable dynamics is the necessity for creativity and innovation. As we have shown, the capacity to generate undecidable dynamics is based upon three underlying factors: (i) the program-data duality; (ii) the potential to access an infinite computational medium; and (iii) the ability to implement negation. It is interesting to note parallels between these principles and Markose's ingredients for novelty generation by digital agents, underpinned by Gödel -Turing -Post approach [45] : (1) agents can operate on encoded information and store codes; (2) agents can do offline simulations that involve self-referential metacalculations, i.e., deal with Gödel meta-mathematics; and (3) agents can record negation and, therefore, "can process the logical archetype of the Liar in a fixed point setting". These considerations emphasize once more the self-referential basis of undecidable dynamics, not only providing foundations for the most general computational frameworks, but also revealing paths for implementing complex adaptive systems.
